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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
G.f\ YLAND, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ~ 
vs. 
SAL11 LAI<E COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH; LAMONT B. GUNDERSEN, \Case No. 
EDWIN Q. CANNON, JR., and 9280 
WILLIAM G. LARSON, Individually 
and as members of the Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 
Defendants and Appellants, , 
Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent 
INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff owned certain lands in Salt Lake County 
some distance southeast of Salt Lake City limits. Action was 
brought by the plaintiff against Salt Lake County and the 
County Commissioners for a Declaratory Judgment declaring 
the zoning resolutions of Salt Lake County unlawful and illegal 
because of the failure of the Commission to follow the statu-
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tory procedure in adopting the same. The complaint also asked 
in the alternative that the court order a reclassification of a 
portion of the plaintiff's lands from Residential R-2 to Com-
mercial C-2 classification on the grounds that the classification 
as Residential R-2 was unreasonable, arbitrary and an abuse of 
the discretion of the county commissioners. The evidence was 
stipulated to by the parties and judgment was entered in favor 
of the plaintiff ordering the reclassification on the grounds 
that the R-2 classification was arbitrary and unreasonable. 
The court found that the County Commission had failed 
to observe the terms of the statutes in adopting the zoning 
resolutions, but refused to declare the resolutions invalid. The 
defendants appealed from the decision of the court ordering 
the reclassification. The plaintiff cross-appealed from the re-
fusal of the court to declare the zoning resolutions invalid. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The plaintiff is the owner of a sizable tract of land in 
Salt Lake County located near the intersection of 5600 South 
and 13th East. This land was classified by Salt Lake County 
in its zoning regulations as Residential R-2, which prohibited 
the building thereon of a commercial shopping center. 
The plaintiff made application to the Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission for the reclassification of approximately 
18 acres of the property owned by the plaintiff from Residential 
R-2 to Commercial C-2. The County Planning Commission, 
after securing the consent of the plaintiff, ieduced the amount 
of land to be reclassified from 18 acres to 10 acres, and unani-
n1ousl y recommended to the County Commission that said 10 
acres be so reclassified. 
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The matter was set down for public hearing. At the hear-
ing a petition favoring the cha~ge in zoning, signed by in 
excess of 1000 residents of the area, was submitted in evidence. 
~\ number of residents of the immediate area appeared and 
gave testimony in support of the proposed change. No witnesses 
residing or owning land in the immediate vicinity opposed the 
change. HoVv'ever, there were several witnesses owning com-
peting cotnmercial property located from 1h mile to 31h miles 
from the property in question that appeared in opposition. No 
representatives of the county or of the state appeared to give 
any testimony regarding highway congestion, sanitation or any 
other tnatters \vhich might be taken into consideration in such 
a situation. After the hearing the County Commission voted 
2 - 1 to deny the reclassification. Commissioner Cannon, one 
of the commissioners voting against the reclassification, clear] y 
stated in the Commission meeting at the time of casting his vote 
that he was so voting because of the effect the rezoning would 
have on competing commercial properties. 
Salt Lake County has never adopted a master plan for 
zoning, nor has it ever set up or established any standards to 
determine the classification of any particular area. Zoning in 
the county has proceeded and in this case did proceed merely 
upon the whims of the individual commissioners as to whether 
a certain area should be zoned commercial or residential. 
As a basis for seeking a reversal of the decision of the 
District Court, the appellants rely on three points. We will 
hereafter in our brief discuss these points in the order in which 
they are raised by the appellants. 
In addition to meeting the argument of the appellants, it 
is the position of the respondent that the zoning resolutions of 
Salt Lake County should be declared invalid as prayed for in 
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the complaint and in seeking such relief the respondent relies 
upon the following 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING TH.A.T THE 
FAILURE OF SALT LAKE COUNTY TO ADOPT A MAS-
TER PLAN FOR LAND UTILIZATION DOES NOT IN-
VALIDATE THE ZONING RESOLUTIONS OF SALT 
LAI<E COUNTY. 
ARGUMENT 
In this brief we will answer under the headings Points 
1, 2 and 3 the respective points raised by the appellant. Under 
Point 4 we will argue the point raised by the respondent on 
cross-appeal. 
POINTS ONE AND TWO 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO 
REVIEW ZONING ACTIONS OF THE BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS WHERE THE BOARD ACTS 
UNREASONABLY AND ARBITRARILY AND IN ABUSE 
OF SOUND DISCRETION. 
Points 1 and 2 as set forth by counsel for the appellant 
in their brief are closely related and can best be considered in 
conjunction with each other. In making their argument counsel 
have selected out of context language from a number of Utah 
cases and have come up with a conclusion that these cases do 
not support, in fact a conclusion that these cases directly refute. 
In effect, counsel argue: 
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(a) Zoning is a legislative function; 
(b) The courts may not interfere with the legislative 
process. 
Therefore, the courts may not revtew any action of the 
county commissioners pertaining to zoning. 
It is true that the case of Walton v. Tracy Collins Trust, 
97 Ut. 249, 92 Pac.2d 724 has a paragraph contained therein 
to the effect that zoning power is a legislative function. It is 
also true that the old case of City of 0 gden v. Crossman, 17 Ut. 
66, 53 Pac. 985 has language which implies that under no cir-
cumstances rna y the court interfere with the legislative process 
so long as the legislative process is actually confined to its 
proper sphere. However, in numerous cases, the court has 
expressly held that the zoning function may be reviewed by 
the courts not only when the zoning body exceeds its jurisdic-
tion, but also where it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably or other-
wise abuses sound discretion. 
In the Walton case there was not involved the power of 
the court to review the zoning regulations of a city. In that 
case was involved the question of the power of a subsidiary 
administrative body to exercise the zoning power. A number 
of subsequent cases however, some of which are in fact quoted 
by the appellant, definitely establish that the courts do have 
the Jurisdiction to review the zoning function. The language 
in the case of Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Ut. 111, 141 Pac. 
2d 704 clearly states the extent of the power of the court to 
revie\v the zoning function. There the court said-: 
"Unless the action of such body (the city commis-
sion) is arbitrary, discri~t.NAT,y_!fOf unreasonable or 
clearly offends some provision of the constitution or 
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statute, the court must uphold it, if within the grant of 
power to the municipality." 
From this language, .it- is obvious that the court may assume 
jurisdiction to review the action of the city commission in zoning 
matters in cases where (a) they act beyond their power as 
granted by the statutes of the state; or (b) although acting 
within 'the scope of such power, they act arbitrarily or unreason-
ably, or where they offend against some provision of the con-
stitution or statute. 
In the case of Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City. 
et al., 116 Ut. 536, 212 Pac. 2d 177, the court stated: 
((Sections 15-8-89, 90, 91, and 92, U.C.A. 1943, grant 
the governing body of the city the discretionary power 
to district and zone cities for various purposes that are 
to the public interest; and the exercise of that power 
will not be interfered with by the courts unless tbe 
discretion is abused:'' 
In the case of Dou'se v. Salt Lake City, 123 Ut. 107, 225 
Pac. 2d 723, the court stated: 
<(The wisdom of the plan, the necessity, the number, 
nature and boundaries of the district are matters which 
lie within the discretion of the city authorities, and only 
if their action is confiscato1'y, discriminatory or arbitrary 
1nay the court set aside their action.·· 
The power of the court to review actions of the zoning 
body to determine w-hether or not they are arbitrary, discrimina-
tory or confiscatory is likewise upheld in th case of S1nith l'. Bar-
rett, 20 Pac. 2d864. See also Provo City tJ. Claudin, 91 U. 60, 
63 P. 2d 570. 
There can be, therefor~~, no question as to the jurisdiction 
of the court to hear the case or to issue the order in question. 
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The only matter for determination is whether or not the evi-
dence establishes that the action of the county commission was 
arbitrary or unreasonable or otherwise not in pursuance of the 
zoning po,vers conferred upon them generally under the police 
powers of the state. These are matters which we will discuss 
in the next succeeding section. 
We have no quarrel with the statement of counsel nor 
\vith the cases which they cite to the effect that we n1ay not 
inquire into the motives of the county commission. In this 
regard they seem to have erected a straw man in order to blow 
it down. No where in the findings is the question of motive 
mentioned. It matters not what impelled members of the county 
commission to vote in a certain way if there is a good sound 
basis for their so voting. If there is a good sound basis to sup-
port the vote, the action of the commission may be sustained 
even though the thing which compelled the commissioners to 
vote as they did was wholly frivolous and not germane to the 
question. On the other hand, though they may have voted with 
the noblest of motives if there is no sound fundamental reason 
to support the position which they take, their action cannot be 
upheld. Therefore, the question into which we must look here 
is not, what were their motives, but was there good sound basic 
reason for what they did under the police power of the state. 
This \vill be discussed in the next succeeding section. 
POINT III 
THE COUNTY COMMISSION'S ACTION IN REFUS-
ING THE REZONING OF THE PROPERTY IN QUES-
TION WAS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY Al'JD AN 
ABUSE OF SOUND DISCRETION. 
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The plaintiff made application to the County Planning 
Commission to rezone 80 acres in the vicinity of 56th South 
and 1250 East to permit the creation of an area shopping center. 
This application was turned down by the Planning Commission. 
After working further with the Planning Commission, the 
plaintiff submitted his revised application to rezone 18.78 acres. 
The Planning Commission held hearings on this proposal and 
after a full investigation recommended the rezoning on the 23rd 
day of May, 1959, and cited as the reason for their action the 
following: 
Hit was felt that this commercial center is needed 
because of the existing and anticipated growth in this 
area and the lack of commercial facilities to serve the 
expansion.'' 
Because of certain problems with approach roads, the matter 
was further investigated by the Planning Commission, and the 
plaintiff reduced the amount of land sought to be rezoned to 
10 acres. Again the Planning Commission took favorable action. 
On August 25, 1959, it unanimously approved the application 
of the plaintiff, and it stated under the caption ((Reasons for 
Action'' (Exhibit 1) : 
c cIt was found that a neighborhood shopping center 
was necessary to serve the growing population in this 
part of the County." 
The County Commission called a public hearing on the matter 
for November 4, 1959. At this hearing a petition \Vas filed, 
signed by over 1,000 residents in the area immediately sur-
rounding the area proposed to be rezoned. The petition 
contained the signature of substantially every resident of 
property adjoining the 10 acre piece, or so near thereto as to 
be affected by the operation of a shopping center thereon. 
10 
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There also appeared at the hearing and gave statements some 
14 witnesses from the immediate vicinity. No witness residing 
near the land in question appeared in protest. No \vitness of 
the County or other civic groups appeared for the purpose 
of giving testin1ony as to congestion of streets, sewage disposal 
or other problems. There were 14 witnesses appearing in 
opposition. Each one of the 14 witnesses appearing in oppo-
sition either ov.rned, or was an attorney for the owner of, 
land in southeast Salt Lake County which is zoned con1-
merciall y. Some of these commercially zoned lands already 
had commercial buildings thereon, while others were merely 
bare land being held by the owners for speculation. A reading 
of the testimony of these 14 witnesses shows that the sole 
reason given by them in opposition to the proposed change 
was that it would have a detrimental effect on their own 
property. After the hearing the Commission sat on the matter 
for some five n1onths without action. On March 14, 1960, 
they denied the zoning change. Commissioner Gundersen 
voted for the change and Commissioners Cannon and Larson 
voted against it. In casting his vote against the change, Com-
missioner Cannon frankly stated that he was voting against 
it because of its impact on other commercial zones in the 
area ( R. 18) . In setting down their reasons for this action, the 
Commissioners stated: ~~There is sufficient commercial zontng 
tn the area; not warranted at this time." (Ex. 1). 
The power of the County to zone or rezone property is 
based upon the police power, and in the absence of a valid 
exercise of that power a zoning restriction cannot stand. The 
follow·ing language is found at 101 Corpus Juris Secundunz 
705: 
11 
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((In general, zoning, or lawful zoning, is within and 
constitutes a lawful and valid exercise of the police 
power, and its validity may be sustained thereunder. 
Subject to constitutional and statutory guaranties, limi-
tations, and restrictions, as discussed infra Sec. 17, and 
to the requirement that they must be reasonable, infra 
Sec. 68, the validity of zoning enactments, regulations, 
and restrictions is dependent on their being within and 
constituting a valid exercise of the police power, or on 
their having a reasonable relation thereto, and, hence, 
they must fall as invalid unless they are within and can 
be supported as a legitimate exercise thereof." 
In order to be a valid exercise of the police power, action 
taken by public authority thereunder must be reasonably 
related to the public health, safety, welfare or morals. Zoning 
authorities do not sit as boards of business regulation for 
the purpose of determining whether or not competition shall 
be allowed in lawful commercial pursuits. While zoning 
authorities often attempt to occupy this position, where it 
appears that there is no valid basis for their action, except 
the matter of limiting commercial competition, the courts 
are unanimous in holding that such is not a valid exercise 
of the zoning powers. If an economic advantage is conveyed 
upon the owner of land by coincident in the course of the 
exercising of the police power for the protection of the public 
health, safety, morals or welfare, such a conferring of eco-
nomic advantage does not invalidate the zoning regulation. 
However, when there is no other valid supporting reason for 
the regulation except the question of limiting commercial 
competition, it must fail. The follo\\·ing language is found 
in the case of In re Lieb' s Appeal, 116 Atl. ( 2) 860, at page 
865: 
12 
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"Under some circumstances zoning does limit compe-
tition by restricting the area within \vhich it can be 
established or conducted. This is a by-product of zon-
ing. An ordinance which results in the restriction of 
competition is not unlawful because of it, but the pur-
pose of zoning is not to limit or restrict competition. 
It \vould be unlawful for a council to zone or rezone 
or refuse to zone or rezone for this purpose. Unlike 
public utility laws, zoning is not for the purpose of 
limiting or prohibiting competition and when that is 
the only purpose of a zoning ordinance, it must be 
declared invalid. The appellant is not entitled to pro-
tection against competition by means of a zoning 
ordinance." 
Another case passing upon the same point is the case of 
Benson t'. Zoning Board of Appeals (Conn.), 27 Atl. (2) 
389, at page 391, where the court stated: 
"The record shows that the court's decision was pred-
icated upon the premise that the defendants' denial 
of the application was based on the objection of the 
competitors which were not (a proper factor to be con-
sidered under the zoning act.' The court was correct in 
holding that the zoning authority had no right to regard 
the preventing of competition as a factor in administer-
ing the zoning law." 
We know that in the practice of law that it is unusual to 
find a case reported where all of the fact situations are the 
same as in the case under consideration. However, in this 
instance, we do have such a case recently decided by the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia. 1'his case 
is Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Davis, reported 
at 106 S.E. (2) 152. In that case the owners of certain property 
which was zoned for_, residential purposes and was being sub-
13 
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divided, applied for a zoning change to permit the use of 
tv1enty-one acres of the property as a shopping center. Some 
1200 residents of the area signed a petition in favor of the 
rezoning. The main opposition came from the developers of 
another shopping center one and a quarter miles away from 
the property in question. The planning commission, by a vote 
of 9-2, favored granting the application. After a hearing, 
the board of county supervisors, by a vote of 6-1, denied the 
rezoning. The matter was taken to courts and the lower court 
held that the board had improperly denied the application for 
rezoning because the principal ground for denial was the 
effect upon a competing shopping center. This decision was 
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the lower 
court. The Court of Appeals stated: 
((It is not a proper function of a zoning ordinance to 
restrict competition or to protect an enterprise which 
may have been encouraged by a prior zoning classifi-
cation. * * * As Frederick H. Burr, Jr., a planning and 
economic development consultant, who testified on 
behalf of the Reed Estate said: 
(( 'The only point at which it is proper in zoning, in 
my opinion, to consider the economic effects is the 
point at which the economic effects reach into the gen-
eral welfare. So far as holding one piece of ground for 
a shopping center and prohibiting other shopping cen-
ters which are needed simply because a prior commit-
ment has been made or a prior piece of land has been 
zoned is not-it does not properly come under zoning 
as a function.' * * * We agree with the holding of the 
lower Court that the evidence shows that the denial 
by the board of rezoning application was based upon 
improper factors 'vhich bore no reasonable relation to 
the public health, safety, morals or welfare of the 
14 
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community and was therefor arbitrary, unreasonable 
and invalid." 
For other cases of the same general holding, see Duncan 
/lz.·e. Corporation v. Jersey City, 122 N.J. 292; 5 Atl. (2) 68; 
G,t/;rielson L'. Borough of Glen Ridge, (N.J.) 176 Atl. 676, 
Robinson z·. Tou·n Council of Narragansett, (R.I.) 199 Atl. 308. 
This case falls exactly within the decided cases. Appli-
cation was first made for this change in classification to the 
County Planning Commission. Provision for the appointment 
of this Commission is made by Sec. 17-27-2, U.C.A. 1953. 
The next succeeding section of the statute gives this board 
the authority to hire technical advisors and experts and to 
employ a staff for the purposeof carrying out their functions 
of making zoning recommendations to the County Commission. 
17-27-14, U.C.A., 1953 provides that all applications for 
arnendment must go first to the County Planning Commission. 
The plaintiff complied with this statute exactly. In making 
changes in the proposal the recommendations of the County 
Planning Commission were concurred in by the plaintiff. When 
this matter was sent down to the County Commission, this ad-
visory body of the County Commission, which had gone into all 
aspects of the case as far as public health, safety, welfare and 
morals \vere concerned, advised the County Commission that 
there \vas no good reason to prohibit commercial development 
on this property. In fact, they found that it would be of 
benefit to the gro,vth of the area. Presumably, therefore, the 
only thing before the County Commission when it considered 
the matter \Vas the recommendation of its advisory board plus 
'vhatever had been brought out at the hearing. As we have 
pointed out, there was nothing brought out at the hearing 
15 
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which would v:arrant the restriction of this property against 
commercial use. 
In their brief, the County has attempted to sustain their 
action on the basis of a passing statement found on page 60 
of the record of the hearing before the Commission. A Mrs. 
Rippe, the owner of a competing porperty some three miles 
away, had the following to say in regard to the problem of 
traffic: 
((Imagine how many cars are going to line up in that 
small area before they swing out of the area and wait 
for the red signal to turn green. I am in the insurance 
business and I know that bumpers have actually hit on 
the small shopping areas.'' 
Her principal basis for opposition, however, was stated in more 
detail, and she concluded as follows: 
''I also feel that the type of developer that our op-
ponent is that if he is beginning with ten acres, he is a 
very progressive man; he will be requesting more later. 
It will have a tendency to hurt all shopping centers.'' 
Commissioner Cannon, when casting his vote, and the 
other Commissioners when putting down the basis for their 
action, were frank to state that their action was not based upon 
the things properly withinthe police power, but was based 
solely upon the question of whether or not they felt additional 
zoning for commercial purposes would have an adverse effect 
upon the lands already zoned commercially. This was the 
finding of the trial court, a finding which is supported-in 
fact compelled-by the evidence. Under the uniform holding 
of the courts construction of commercial buildings on the ten 
acres in question may not be prohibited on this basis. The 
action of the court below should be upheld in this regard. 
16 
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POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PAILURE OF SALT LAKE COUNTY TO ADOPT A MAS-
TER PLAN FOR LAND UTILIZATION DOES NOT IN-
VALIDATE THE ZONING REGULATIONS OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY. 
Counties are political bodies of limited authority. They 
are created by the state and have no powers except those that 
the state grants them either by specific provision or by necessary 
implication. Constitution of Utah, Article I, Sec. 4, 17-4-1, 
U.C.A. 1953. The powers of a county are entirely dependent 
upon the statutory grant of power and county governments 
are more restricted in their powers than are the governments 
of incorporated cities. Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58 U. 546 
at page 562, 200 P. 510 at page 516. Chapter 27 of Title 17 
U.C.A., 1953 grants to County Commissioners the power to 
zone, however, the power in not a limitless grant. This chapter 
makes provision for the method and the steps to be taken 
by the County Commission in adopting zoning regulations. 
Sec. 17-27-1 provides: 
C!The boards of county commissioners of the respec-
tive counties within the state are authorized and em-
powered to provide for the physical development of 
the unincorporated territory within the county and for 
the zoning of all or any part of such unincorporated 
territory in the 1nanner hereinafter provided.'' (Eln-
phasis added.) 
Sec. 17-27-4 to Sec. 17-27-11 inclusive make provision for 
the procedure to be followed by the County Commission in 
adopting zoning resolutions and in particular sets up the 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
requirement that prior to adopting a valid zoning ordinance, 
the Con1mission must adopt a comprehensive master plan for 
the development of the unincorporated areas of the county. 
Sec. 17-27-5 states the general purposes in making a 
master plan as follows: 
('In the preparation of a county master plan, a county 
planning com1nission shall make careful and compre-
hensive surveys and studies of the existing conditions 
and probable future growth of the territory within its 
jurisdiction. The county master plan shall be made \vith 
the general purpose of guiding and accomplishing a 
coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of 
the county which will, in accordance with the present 
and future needs and resources, best promote the health, 
safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, or the 
general welfare of the inhabitants, as well as efficiency 
and economy in the process of development, including 
amongst other things, the distribution of population 
and of the uses of land for urbanization, trade, indus-
try, habitation, recreation, agriculture, arboretum and 
other purposes, as will tend to create conditions favor-
able to health, safety, transportation, prosperity, civic 
activities, and recreational, educational and cultural 
opportunities; will tend to reduce the wastes of physi-
cal, financial, or human resources which result from 
either excessive congestion or excessive scattering of 
population; and will tend toward an efficient and eco-
nomical utilization, conservation and production of the 
supply of food and water, and of drainage, sanitary, 
and other facilities and resources." 
Sec. 17-27-9 to 17-27-11 deal exclusively with the land 
utilization or zoning portion of the master plan. Sec. 17-27-9 
provides as follows: 
18 
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uThe county planning commission of any county may, 
and upon order of the board of county commissioners 
in any county having a county planning commission, 
shall make a zoning plan or plans for zoning all or any 
part of the unincorporated territory within such county, 
including both the full text of the zoning resolution 
or resolutions and the maps, and representing the rec-
ommendations of the commission for the regulation by 
districts or zones of the location, heights, bulk, and 
size of buildings and other structures, percentage of lot 
which may be occupied, the size of lots, courts, and 
other open spaces, the density and distribution of popu-
lation, the location and use of buildings and structures 
for trade, industry, residence, recreation, public activi-
ties or other purposes, and the uses of land for trade, 
industry, recreation or other purposes." 
Sec. 17-27-10 provides for the presentation of the zoning 
plan to the county commissioners and the holding of public 
hearings thereon. The pertinent part thereof is as follows: 
((After receiving the certification of said zoning plan 
or plans from the commission and be fore the adoption 
of any zoning resolution or resolutions, the board of 
county commissioners shall hold a public hearing 
thereon * * * * ." (Emphasis added). 
From the foregoing, it is evident that before the County 
Commission may adopt any valid zoning resolution or reso-
lutions it is required by the state legislature to hold a hearing 
on and adopt a comprehensive zoning plan, which it was 
conceded by the defendants, and which the court held, has not 
been done. This provision appears again in Sec. 17-27-11, 
\\·hich is the section of the Utah statutes which actually grants 
to the counties the power to adopt zoning resolutions. This 
section provides as follows: 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rr From and ajte1· the time when the county planning 
corrunission of any county, in accordance with the pro-
cedure hereinabove specified~ makes, adopts and certi-
fies to the board of county commissioners a plan or 
plans for zoning the unincorporated territory within 
any county, or any part thereof, including both the full 
text of a zoning resolution and the maps, and after 
public hearing thereon, then the board of commission-
ers, may by resolution regulate in any potrion or por-
tions of such county which lie outside of cities and 
towns, the location, height, bulk and size of buildings 
and other structures, the percentage of lot which may 
be occupied, th e size of yards, courts and other open 
spaces, the uses of buildings and structures for trade, 
industry, residence, recreation, public activities or other 
purposes, and the uses of land for trade, industry, 
residence, recreation or other purposes. * * * * ." 
(Emphasis added) . 
It is conceded in the pleadings and was admitted by counsel 
in the court below that Salt Lake County has not complied with 
the law in regard to the establishing a master plan and hold-
ing hearings thereon. This it has not done in spite of the fact 
that the statute has been on the books in its present form since 
1943, and in spite of the fact that the adoption of such a 
master plan is by the statute made a definite prerequisite to 
the po\\'er of the county commission to adopt zoning regula-
tions and resolutions. 
The requirement for such a master plan is common in 
the statutes of various states. The reason for such a require-
ment is obvious. Unless there is such a master plan, zoning 
becomes, as it has become in Salt Lake County a hit-and-miss 
proposition. The County Comn1ission can as it attempted to do 
in this case, sit as a body regulating economic competition. 
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• The county comnltsstoners can grant or withhold economic 
favors on the basis of their personal likes or dislikes, or on 
the basis of any other reason without relation to the question 
of public health, safety, welfare or morals. Wherever such 
a requirement for a master plan exists and where it has not 
been met, the courts have, with uniformity, held that the 
zoning po,ver may not be exercised. 
The following language in this regard is found at 101 
C.J.S. 735: 
(<In order to achieve specified statutory purposes, 
it is usually required that zoning regulations be in 
accordance with some well-considered and comprehen-
sive plan; and such regulations must adopt a definite 
policy * * * " 
The follo,ving statement is made by the authors of Ameri-
can Jurisprudence at 58 Am. Jur. 957: 
(<Statutes or charters authoriz!~g the enactment of 
zoning ordinances frequently contain the provision that 
any such ordinance shall be in accord with a well-con-
sidered and comprehensive plan, and a zoning ordinance 
may be declared invalid where it does not comply with 
such provision.'' 
The state of New York has a requirement similar to ours 
relating to the adoption of a ~ewell-considered plan." Such a 
plan had not been adopted by the City of Utica, and in striking 
do\vn a zoning ordinance of that city, the court in Utica v. 
Hanna,. 195 N.Y.S. 225, stated: 
co Beautification of our cities deserves encouragement, 
but measures looking toward beautification must be 
the result of careful study of the interests of all persons 
affected, so that the total operation of such measures 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
will surely result in gain to the city as a whole. It 'Nas 
doubtless this thought which led the legislature to 
require the zoning ordinances to follow a well-consid-
ered plan." 
In the case of Chapman v. Troy, 4 So. 2d 1, a similar 
result was reached. 1'he Alabama law required in regard to 
zoning regulations that usuch regulation shall be made in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan." There the court 
stated: 
UA single ordinance laying off a small portion of 
the city as a residence district, taking no account of 
other areas equally residential in character, and so far 
as appears without any comprehensive plan with a view 
to the general wei fare of the inhabitants of the city 
as a whole, is not permissible. Piecemeal ordinances 
are not favored." 
See also in this regard Tex~.trkana v. Marby, 95 SW.2d 871. 
In the case of Darlington v. Frankfo1't, 140 SW 2d 392, the 
Kentucky court held that where the legislative authorization 
for zoning express! y required the zoning ordinance to be 
adopted only after the appointment of a zoning commission, 
having in mind a survey by it of the entire city, the city cannot 
justify the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting the erection 
of comtnercial buildings on a street in the absence of a meeting 
of the prerequisites for the~r.ising of the zoning authority. 
The finding of the Trial Court in this case is proper. 
In fact it is necessary under the pleadings and under the 
stipulation of counsel. However, its conclusion of law is 
erroneous. Obviously this plaintiff is a person injured by the 
failure of the County Commission to follo\v the proper pro-
cedure in the adopting of the zoning resolutions. Had there 
been a master plan and master resolutions set up and a public 
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hearing had thereon as required by the statute, this plaintiff 
might have appeared there and might have had an oppor-
tunity to protest the resolutions before they were ever adopted. 
Furthermore, it should be fundamental that if the grant of 
the zoning power to the County Commission is made upon 
certain conditions and if those conditions have not been met, 
it is acting without authority in adopting any zoning resolutions 
and its actions are void from the beginning and tn no way 
limit or restrict the use of the property. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, plaintiff submits that 
the Salt Lake County zoning resolutions should be declared 
unlawful and void. In the absence of such a holding the evi-
dence and the law clearly warrant this court in sustaining the 
finding of the Trial Court to the effect that the restrictions 
placed upon commercial construction on the plaintiff's property 
are unreasonable and arbitrary and should not be allowed 
to stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent 
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